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Abstract
Video classification is a challenging task in computer vision.
Although Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have achieved ex-
cellent performance in video classification, recent research
shows adding imperceptible perturbations to clean videos can
make the well-trained models output wrong labels with high
confidence. In this paper, we propose an effective defense
framework to characterize and defend adversarial videos.
The proposed method contains two phases: (1) adversarial
video detection using temporal consistency between adjacent
frames, and (2) adversarial perturbation reduction via denois-
ers in the spatial and temporal domains respectively. Specif-
ically, because of the linear nature of DNNs, the impercepti-
ble perturbations will enlarge with the increasing of DNNs’
depth, which leads to the inconsistency of DNNs’ output be-
tween adjacent frames. However, the benign video frames of-
ten have the same outputs with their neighbor frames owing
to the slight changes. Based on this observation, we can dis-
tinguish between adversarial videos and benign videos. Af-
ter that, we utilize different defense strategies against dif-
ferent attacks. We propose the temporal defense, which re-
constructs the polluted frames with their temporally neigh-
bor clean frames, to deal with the adversarial videos with
sparse polluted frames. For the videos with dense polluted
frames, we use an efficient adversarial denoiser to process
each frame in the spatial domain, and thus purify the pertur-
bations (we call it as spatial defense). A series of experiments
conducted on the UCF-101 dataset demonstrate that the pro-
posed method significantly improves the robustness of video
classifiers against adversarial attacks.
Introduction
With the rapid growth of video data on the internet, auto-
matic video classification (Karpathy et al. 2014a) is becom-
ing more and more important. Specifically, this task includes
action recognition (Yue-Hei Ng et al. 2015), scene classifi-
cation (Huang et al. 1999), object classification (Zhang et al.
2007) and so on. Inspired by the great performance of Con-
volutional Neural Networks (CNNs)(LeCun, Bengio, and
Hinton 2015), more and more researchers have begun to ap-
ply the deep learning to the video classification task (Karpa-
thy et al. 2014b), and achieved great success. However, some
research works (Wei, Zhu, and Su 2019; Li et al. 2018;
Zajkac M et al. 2018) show that video classification is vul-
nerable to the adversarial examples (Nguyen, Yosinski, and
Clune 2015), just like the case in images (Szegedy et al.
2013; Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014). Different
from static images, attacking video classification not only
needs to consider the spatial information but also needs to
consider the temporal information.
The study for video attacks is less so far. To our knowl-
edge, there are only three related papers (Wei, Zhu, and
Su 2019; Li et al. 2018; Zajkac M et al. 2018). In sum-
mary, these methods can be roughly divided into two classes,
the first one can be called as sparse attack, which denotes
only some key frames in a video are polluted, the generated
adversarial perturbations are temporally sparse. For exam-
ple, in (Wei, Zhu, and Su 2019), the authors propose that
the slight perturbations added the current frame can trans-
fer to the next frames via the temporal interactions between
frames, and thus don’t need to pollute every frame. Using
iterative optimization algorithm based on l2,1−norm, they
successfully attack the state-of-the-art video classification
model. The other one can be called as dense attack, which
means that all the frames in a video are polluted, such as
in (Li et al. 2018), a generative method for adversarial per-
turbations is proposed to attack the real-time video classifi-
cation system. Because the test phase only involves a feed-
forward network, the attacking efficiency is high. Besides, it
also explores a robust 3D adversarial perturbations to over-
come the varying boundaries of video clips.
To defend adversarial examples, many kinds of research
techniques have been proposed. In the image case, adversar-
ial training (Trame`r et al. 2017) is a widely used technique,
it improves the DNNs’ robustness by adding adversarial ex-
amples into the training dataset to retrain the classification
model. In addition, (Liao et al. 2018) proposes that image
denoising can be used to perform the defense task, and de-
signs a High-level representation Guided Denoiser (HGD)
to remove the adversarial perturbations. Inspired by this,
ComDefend (Jia et al. 2018) argues that image compres-
sion is useful to defend adversarial examples, and presents
an end-to-end image compression model to achieve defense.
We can see all the above methods are designed for static im-
ages classification. The temporal information within videos
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Figure 1: The proposed framework consists of two steps: adversarial video detection and adversarial video defense. In the
detection stage, the temporal consistency of videos is used to achieve the goal. In particular, we classify the video into three
types (clean videos, sparse adversarial videos and dense adversarial videos) by quantitative analysis of the detection network
outputs. In the defense stage, our method consists of temporal defense and spatial defense. The spatial defense is used to defend
the dense adversarial attacks. And the temporal defense takes charge of defending the sparse adversarial attacks.
are not considered, therefore, these methods are not com-
pletely suitable to defend the adversarial videos. We need
a new framework to defend adversarial examples for video
classification.
For this reason, in this paper, we propose an effective de-
fense framework to characterize and defend video adversar-
ial examples. Our method contains two steps. The first step
is to detect the adversarial videos using temporal consistency
between adjacent frames. If the input video is benign, we di-
rectly feed it to the well-trained video classifier. Otherwise,
an extra pre-processing module is used to denoise it. We ac-
complish this task by using the temporal consistency (Xiao
et al. 2018)(video frames which are temporally close have
similar image characteristics). It is known that one accepted
reason behind adversarial examples is the linear nature of
DNNs (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2014). The im-
perceptible perturbations added on the images will enlarges
with the increasing of DNNs’ depth, which leads to the in-
consistency of DNNs’ output between adjacent frames. By
contrast, the benign video frames often have the same out-
puts with their neighbor frames owing to the slight changes.
This difference can help us distinguish between adversarial
videos and benign videos. In the implementation, we present
a metric to represent the degree of temporal consistency, and
then use a threshold to classify them. The second step is
to reduce the adversarial perturbations via the different de-
noisers in the spatial and temporal domains respectively. As
for the sparse attack (Wei, Zhu, and Su 2019), we propose
the temporal defense method, which utilizes the temporal
interactions between frames, and reconstructs the polluted
frames with their temporally neighbor clean frames. As for
the dense attack (Li et al. 2018), we use the spatial defense
method, which uses an efficient adversarial denoiser to pro-
cess each frame in the spatial domain, and obtain their clean
versions. We propose the corresponding defense strategies
according to the properties of the attacks. Experiments show
that temporal defense obtains the best performance against
sparse attack, and spatial defense is also the best to defend
the dense attack. Figure 1 illustrates the overall framework.
In summary, this paper has the following contributions:
(1) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first one to ex-
plore the defense for adversarial videos, and further, propose
a two-step defense framework for video classification. The
proposed framework utilizes different defense strategies ac-
cording to the properties of attacks. Experiments show that
our method significantly improves the robustness of video
classifiers.
(2) We design the adversarial video detection method
based on the temporal consistency between adjacent frames.
We find that the linear nature of DNNs will lead to the
temporal inconsistency for adversarial videos, and further,
present a metric to represent the degree of temporal consis-
tency. Using this metric, a simple threshold can be used to
classify the adversarial videos.
(3) We propose the temporal defense against the sparse at-
tack. Temporal defense utilizes the temporal interactions be-
tween adjacent frames, and reconstructs the polluted frames
with their neighbor clean frames, and thus purifies the ad-
versarial perturbations. Temporal defense is the first one to
explore the structured information in videos to perform ad-
versarial defense task.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 briefly reviews the related work. Section 3 introduces
the details of the proposed framework. Section 4 shows a se-
ries of experimental results and analysis. Finally, Section 5
gives the conclusion.
Related work
Video classification
Currently, there are three kinds of deep learning methods
for video classification. The first one is to use the exist-
ing image classification methods to achieve video classifi-
cation. In particular, this method regards the video as a col-
lection of frames. Typically, it uses the pre-trained network
on ImageNet (Deng et al. 2009) to extract frame features
and then overlays them as video features to perform classi-
fication. The second one is to use an end-to-end 3D CNN
architecture to achieve video classification. The difference
with the first method lies in that the part of feature extraction
is directly trained on the video data, such as (Ji et al. 2013;
Tran et al. 2015). The third one is to use CNN+LSTM to
achieve video classification. These methods often use LSTM
(Hochreiter and Schmidhuber 1997) to extract temporal in-
formation of videos. A CNN is firstly used to extract the
frame feature, and then a LSTM is used to explore the
temporal relationship between frames, such as (Donahue
et al. 2017; Yue-Hei Ng et al. 2015). In addition, a kind
of two-stream architecture (Simonyan and Zisserman 2014)
and its variants (Feichtenhofer, Pinz, and Zisserman 2016;
Wu et al. 2015), where one stream is to encode the spatial
information within frames, and another stream is to encode
the temporal information (usually optical flow is extracted
to represent the temporal information) between frames, are
proposed and achieve the competitive performance.
Adversarial attacks
Besides the image classification, video classification mod-
els are also vulnerable to adversarial examples. (Wei, Zhu,
and Su 2019) proposes a kind of sparse attacking method
to attack the CNN+RNN architecture, which is widely used
in the video classification task. Their research demonstrates
that the adversarial perturbations can be transferred between
the video frames. Simultaneously, a dense adversarial attack
method is proposed in (Li et al. 2018). It attacks the C3D
model (Tran et al. 2015), which is also a widely used method
in video classification. The attacking method in (Li et al.
2018) is based on a generating model. And each frame of
the video is added with the generated adversarial perturba-
tions. Also, an adversarial framing is proposed in (Zajkac M
et al. 2018). Compared with (Tran et al. 2015), this method
does not modify the most pixels of the input image. It just
adds an adversarial framing on the image border.
Adversarial defense
In (Trame`r et al. 2017), F. Tramer et al. propose the ad-
versarial training method to retrain the classification model
by adding the adversarial examples into the original train-
ing dataset. The used adversarial examples are pre-generated
by different attack methods. In (Liao et al. 2018), the ad-
versarial perturbations are regarded as a special kind of im-
age noise. HGD is a denoising model for dealing with such
noise. It is also trained by the generated adversarial im-
ages. And in (Jia et al. 2018), an end-to-end compression
model is proposed to defend the adversarial examples. It
uses image compression to break the structure of the ad-
versarial perturbations for defense. In addition, there are
many other defense methods, like (Pang, Du, and Zhu 2018;
Xie et al. 2018; Athalye, Carlini, and Wagner 2018), and so
on. The above defense methods are all focused on the im-
ages. They only consider the spatial information, but ignore
the temporal information. Therefore, these methods are not
completely suitable for the video classification task.
Methodology
The framework of the proposed method
According to the number of polluted frames in the video
data, the current video attacking methods can be divided into
sparse attacks and dense attacks. The different attacks are
defended by the corresponding defense methods in our pa-
per. The proposed framework consists of two phases. The
first one is the detection network which is used to deter-
mine whether the video is attacked, and further, make sure
of the type of the attack. And then, different defense meth-
ods are carried out according to the detection result. As
for the sparse adversarial video attack, which modifies the
fewer frames of the video, we use the temporal defense to
transform the adversarial video into the corresponding clean
video. As for the dense adversarial video attack, which mod-
ifies all the frames of the video, we use the spatial defense to
transform the adversarial video into the corresponding clean
video.
Detection network
There are two main functions of the detection network: (1)
detecting whether the video is attacked, and (2) detecting
what kind of attack the video is subjected to. There is a
high correlation between the adjacent frames of the video.
In (Xiao et al. 2018), in the video object segmentation task,
they propose that the video frames which are temporally
close have similar image characteristics. This phenomenon
can be called as the temporal consistency of the video data.
Through a series of experiments, we find that this phe-
nomenon also exists in the video classification task. In par-
ticular, the outputs produced by the well-trained video clas-
sification maintain consistency in the adjacent frames of the
benign video. By contrast, because of the linear nature of
DNNs, the imperceptible adversarial perturbations will en-
large with the increasing of DNNs’ depth, which leads to
the inconsistency of DNNs’ outputs between the adjacent
frames in the adversarial video. As shown in Figure 2, we
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Figure 2: The detection stage includes the detection network
and consistency calculation. We randomly select 400 video
samples which consist of 200 clean videos and 200 adversar-
ial videos, and then compute their exception index α. The re-
sults are shown in the sub-figure (a). The red line represents
the results of adversarial videos, and the blue line represents
the results of clean videos. In addition, we also randomly se-
lect 400 video samples which consist of 200 sparse adversar-
ial videos and 200 dense adversarial videos. The computed
exception index α values are shown in the sub-figure (b).
The green line represents the dense adversarial videos, and
the yellow line represents the sparse adversarial videos. We
can see that the α values of clean videos, sparse adversarial
videos, and dense adversarial videos are linearly classified.
We can use the simple thresholds to classify them.
feed each frame of the input videos to the well-trained net-
work for video classification to get the classification label.
The CNN+LSTM architecture (Donahue et al. 2015) is used
as the well-trained network in this paper. Note that in or-
der to eliminate the inter-frame effects, we remove the links
between LSTMs in the detection network. If the label of
the current frame is different from the labels of its adjacent
frames, the current frame is regarded as an exception frame.
We define an exception index α to represent the degree of
temporal consistency. It is defined as follows:
α =
1
T
T∑
n=2
[f(n− 1) 6= f(n) ∧ f(n+ 1) 6= f(n)], (1)
where f(n) represents the predicted label of the n-th frame.
And T represents the total number of frames in a video. Ac-
cording to the value of α, we can perform the detection. If
α < γ1, the video is benign. If γ1 ≤ α < γ2, the video
is subjected to the sparse attack. And if γ2 ≤ α, the video
is subjected to the dense attack. In addition, γ1 and γ2 are
hyper-parameters which are determined in the experiments.
We use the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve
to evaluate the proposed detection method. As shown in Fig-
ure 4, the proposed method is appropriate to detect whether
the original video is attacked and determine the type of the
attack. We use the proposed detection network to deal with
randomly selected two sparse adversarial videos and dense
adversarial videos. The result is shown in Figure 3.
Spatial defense
In order to transform the dense adversarial videos to the cor-
responding clean videos, we use an efficient denoiser to pro-
cess each frame. We here select an end-to-end compression
model. As shown in Figure 5, the whole process includes
two modules: image compression module and image recon-
struction module. During the image compression stage, the
ComCNN is used to compress each frame and extract its
main structure information. During the image reconstruc-
tion stage, the RecCNN uses the compressed information
of each frame to reconstruct the corresponding clean frame.
For more details, please refer to (Jia et al. 2018). Because
the operation is conducted within the spatial domain of each
frame, this method is called as spatial defense.
Temporal defense
There is a high correlation between the temporally adjacent
frames of the video. The adversarial frames can be replaced
by the pseudo frames which are reconstructed by the adja-
cent clean frames. Therefore, we propose to use the motion
estimation method to compress the sparse adversarial videos
for defense. In this way, the sparse adversarial video can be
transformed into the corresponding clean video.
Motion estimation (Furht, Greenberg, and Westwater
2012) is a widely used technique in video processing. The
motion estimation can be achieved based on image patch
or image grid. Patch-based motion estimation is widely
used because of its simple algorithm and easy implemen-
tation. We still focus on it. The basic idea of motion esti-
mation is to divide each frame of videos into a number of
non-overlapping patches, and consider that all pixels in the
patches have the same amount of displacement, and then find
the patch that is most similar to the current patch in the ref-
erence frame according to certain matching criteria, called
matching patch. The relative displacement of the matching
patch and the current patch is the motion vector. When the
video is compressed, we only need to save the motion vector
and corresponding residual data to recover the current patch.
Note that using integer Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT)
(Ahmed, Natarajan, and Rao 1974) to compress the corre-
sponding residual data. The motion vector is defined as:
MAD(p,q)(i, j) =
1
M ∗N
M∑
m=0
N∑
n=0
|fk(p+m, q + n)
−fk−1(p+m+ i, q + n+ j)|,
(2)
where fk(m,n) represents the intensity of the pixel with co-
ordinates (m,n) in the kth frame. M represents the width
of the patch. N represents the length of the patch. We use
the patch’s upper left corner coordinates (p, q) to represent
it. And MAD represents the similarity between the present
frame patch (p, q) and the previous frame patch (p+i, q+j).
Vec(i, j) = argminMAD(p,q)(i, j), (3)
where Vec(i, j) represents the motion vector of the present
frame patch (p, q).
(a)Sparse Adversarial Video    (b)Dense Adversarial Video    
Figure 3: The left column is the label of the sparse adversarial video frames and their corresponding clean video frames. The
right column is the label of the dense adversarial video frames and their corresponding clean video frames.
ba
Figure 4: The ROC curves of the proposed detection method
under different thresholds. Subfigure (a) represents the de-
tection performance on the clean and adversarial videos.
Subfigure (b) represents the detection performance on the
sparse and dense adversarial videos.
There is a high correlation between the contents in the
adjacent frames of the video. As for the sparse adversarial
video, a small number of frames are attacked. Inspired by
the idea of motion estimation, we can use the motion esti-
mation method to replace the patches of adversarial video
frames with the patches of clean video frames. As shown in
Figure 6, we can save the patches of clean video frames, the
motion vector and the corresponding residual to reconstruct
the patches of the adversarial video frames. The adversar-
ial video frames can be reconstructed by the clean frame
patches. The quantification of the corresponding residual
can remove the adversarial perturbations. Because the oper-
ation is conducted within the temporal domain of the video,
this method is called as temporal defense.
Experiments and analysis
In this section, we conduct a series of experiments to ver-
ify the effectiveness of the proposed framework, which in-
cludes: adversarial video generation, threshold selection in
the framework, video classification with the proposed frame-
work and result analysis.
Datasets
The detection network is trained on the video dataset
UCF101 (Soomro, Zamir, and Shah 2012) which is widely
used in action recognition. It consists of 13320 videos from
101 action categories. The action categories of UCF101
include sports, playing musical instruments, body-motion,
human-human interaction and human-object interaction. In
ComCNN
RecCNN
Adversarial
Clean
Figure 5: The spatial defense is achieved using the ComDe-
fend (Jia et al. 2018), which includes the ComCNN and
RecCNN modules. Each frame of the video is fed into the
ComCNN to achieve the spatial compression. And the Rec-
CNN is used to reconstruct each frame of the video. We use
the ComDefend to remove spatial redundancy and adversar-
ial perturbations. Because ComDefend is very efficient, it is
quick to deal with the whole video.
Clean Frames Adversarial Frame
Figure 6: The adversarial video is reconstructed by using the
information of the previous clean videos in the patch level.
order to ensure the fairness of the experiment, attack meth-
ods and defense method are all conducted on the UCF101.
We choose more than 8000 videos for training the video
classifier and 3000 videos for testing it. In addition, As for
training the detection network, we also choose these 8000
videos of UCF101. The original ComDefend is trained on
the CIFAR-10 dataset, we don’t modify it and directly use
the well-trained model.
Adversarial video generation
As mentioned previously, the video attacks can be divided
into the sparse adversarial attacks and dense adversarial at-
tacks based on the number of polluted frames. We choose
Table 1: The selection of parameter γ1.
γ1 = 0.075 γ1 = 0.10 γ1 = 0.125 γ1 = 0.15 γ1 = 0.175 γ1 = 0.20 γ1 = 0.225 γ1 = 0.25
Precision 58% 60% 60% 63% 68% 66% 70% 70%
Recall 95% 95% 90% 89% 88% 75% 71% 62%
F1-measure 72% 74% 73% 74% 77% 71% 71% 66%
Table 2: The selection of parameter γ2.
γ2 = 0.25 γ2 = 0.275 γ2 = 0.30 γ2 = 0.325 γ2 = 0.35 γ2 = 0.375 γ2 = 0.40 γ2 = 0.425
Precision 54% 55% 58% 56% 60% 61% 65% 69%
Recall 75% 75% 75% 63% 63% 63% 52% 52%
F1-measure 62% 64% 65% 59% 61% 56% 57% 58%
two typical attacking methods: (Wei, Zhu, and Su 2019) for
the sparse attack and (Li et al. 2018) for the dense attack.
(Wei, Zhu, and Su 2019) chooses CNN+LSTM architecture
as threat models. It uses the characteristic of adversarial per-
turbations that can propagate between frames to attack the
CNN+LSTM architecture. Because the adversarial pertur-
bations are added on a few video frames, this kind of attack
method belongs to the sparse adversarial attack method. (Li
et al. 2018) makes use of a generative model which looks
like a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) architecture
to generate a series of adversarial perturbations. The gen-
erated perturbations are added on each frame of the original
video to fool the C3D model. Because all the frames are pol-
luted, this kind of attack method belongs to dense adversar-
ial attack method. We use these two methods to generate the
adversarial videos on the UCF101 dataset, and then perform
our framework to defend them.
Threshold selection in the detection stage
In the detection stage, two threshold hyperparameters γ1 and
γ2 need to be determined by the experiments. The hyperpa-
rameter γ1 is used to detect whether the input video is at-
tacked. And the hyperparameter γ2 is used to determine the
type of attacks. To determine γ1, we randomly select 500
clean videos from UCF101 dataset, and then generate their
corresponding sparse and dense adversarial videos. Thus,
we obtain 1500 videos. This is a two-category classifica-
tion task. We regard the adversarial videos as the positive
samples, and calculate the precision, recall and F1-measure
under the different values of the parameter γ1. The results
are shown in Table 1. The optimal γ1 is selected according
to the highest F1 metric, where the threshold simultaneously
shows good precision and recall. Under this setting, the γ1
is set to 0.175. To determine γ2, we only use the 500 sparse
adversarial videos and 500 dense adversarial videos to con-
struct a dataset to select the optimal γ2 value. Like γ1, we
also compute the precision, recall and F1-measure on this
dataset. The difference is that dense adversarial videos are
regarded as the positive samples in this case. The final results
are shown in Table 2. We see that the F1-measure achieves
the best performance when γ2 = 0.3. Therefore, in the fol-
lowing experiments, we set γ1 = 0.175 and γ2 = 0.3.
Video defense with the proposed method
The experiments in this section include (1) video classifi-
cation with the spatial defense separately, (2) video classi-
Figure 7: Four examples of the temporal defense for the
sparse adversarial attack. The top row is the clean video
frames, the middle row is the sparse adversarial video
frames, and the bottom row is the temporal defense video
frames.
fication with the temporal defense separately, and (3) video
classification with the different defense strategies combined
with detection. In this way, it is easy to see the performance
of each module of the proposed method.
Video classification with the temporal defense The pro-
posed temporal defense is a pre-processing module, and
does not modify the deployed model. When the input video
is detected as the sparse attack, we firstly use the temporal
defense to denoise it, and then feed it to the deployed model.
To evaluate the performance of the temporal defense, we
give the experiments in Table 3. Two deployed video clas-
sification models are tested: CNN+LSTM and C3D. We use
(Wei, Zhu, and Su 2019) and (Li et al. 2018) to generate the
adversarial videos, and the temporal defense to defend them.
In Table 3, we can see that the temporal defense significantly
improves the classification accuracy of CNN+LSTM from
31% to 64%, but doesn’t work well for the dense attack.
It doesn’t achieve any improvement for C3D (from 59% to
59%). This is expected because the temporal defense makes
use of the image patch of the clean frames to reconstruct the
adversarial frames. As for the sparse attack method, there
are a lot of clean frames in the video, this method can use
them to compress and reconstruct the adversarial frames.
Table 3: Results of different defense methods
Network Attacks No defense Spatial defense Temporal defense
CNN+LSTM Clean videos 78% 66% 76%Sparse (Wei, Zhu, and Su 2019) 31% 55% 64%
C3D Clean videos 89% 81% 88%Dense (Li et al. 2018) 59% 73% 59%
Table 4: The ablation study of our method
Defense method No defense Spatial defense only Temporal defense only Detection+temporal/spatial defense
Accuracy 26% 44% 41% 48%
But as for the dense attack method, all the frames of the
video are attacked, therefore very little available informa-
tion can be used. Even though the adversarial frames are
compressed and reconstructed, the adversarial perturbations
are still alive. The results in Table 3 show that temporal de-
fense is more suitable for defending the sparse attack than
the dense attack. In addition, we also find that temporal de-
fense is friendly to the clean videos. Both for CNN+LSTM
and C3D, the accuracy drop of temporal defense is very
slight, and far below than the drop of defense attack. Be-
cause of this advantage, we don’t need to strictly distinguish
the sparse attacks from the clean videos. The temporal de-
fense video frames, and the corresponding sparse adversarial
video frames and the corresponding clean videos are shown
in Figure 7.
Video classification with the spatial defense The spatial
defense is carried out on the same experimental setup as the
temporal defense. In Table 3, it is clear that the spatial de-
fense achieves the comparable performance both for sparse
attack and dense attack. For the sparse attack, it improves the
accuracy of CNN+LSTM from 31% to 55%. For the dense
attack, it improves the accuracy of C3D from 59% to 73%.
The results show that spatial defense is more suitable for de-
fending the dense attack method than the temporal attack (
73%-59%=14% vs 59%-59%=0%). This is also reasonable
because in the dense attack, all the frames are polluted. In
this situation, we can regard the polluted frames as the adver-
sarial images, and directly apply the image defense method.
ComDefend achieves the state-of-the-art image defense per-
formance, and is also very efficient. Therefore, we choose
ComDefend to defend the dense attack.
Video classification with integrating detection and dif-
ferent defense strategies From the above discussions, it
is clear that the spatial defense is more suitable to defend
the dense attack method and the temporal defense is more
suitable to defend the sparse attack method. In order to inte-
grate the advantages of both methods, we combine the dif-
ferent defense methods with the detection to jointly improve
the robustness of video classifiers. According to the result of
the detection, the corresponding defensive method is used to
protect the well-trained video classification model. In partic-
ular, as shown in Figure 1, if the detection result is the clean
video, the original video is fed to well-trained classifier di-
rectly. If the detection result is the sparse adversarial video,
the temporal defense is used to deal with the original video.
If the detection result is the dense adversarial video, the spa-
tial dense is used to deal with the original video. We choose
500 clean videos, 500 temporal adversarial videos and 500
dense adversarial videos to verify our proposed framework.
Note that these adversarial videos can make the well-trained
classifier give the wrong label. As shown in Table 4, we
can see that the spatial and temporal defense can improve
the classification accuracy of the well-trained classifier. In-
tegrating with these two defense methods and the adversarial
detection obtains the best classification accuracy.
Result analysis
In (Guo et al. 2017), it has demonstrated that the adver-
sarial perturbation of adversarial example has a particular
structure. As for the spatial defense (ComDefend (Jia et al.
2018)), it regards the adversarial perturbation as a kind of
image redundancy information. And then it removes the ad-
versarial perturbations by image compression. This method
is also a kind of adversarial denoiser. Therefore it is suitable
to process the dense adversarial videos. As for the tempo-
ral defense, it makes use of the motion estimation method
to purify the adversarial frames by using the information
of clean frames. In particular, the adversarial frames are re-
constructed by the clean frames, motion vectors and corre-
sponding residual. It destroys the particular structure of the
adversarial perturbations by quantifying the corresponding
residual. Because it should use the information of the clean
frames of adversarial video, it is suitable for the defense
for the sparse adversarial videos. We can use the detection,
which is achieved by the temporal consistency between ad-
jacent frames, to combine the advantages of both defenses to
improve model robustness. That is to say, the selection of the
defensive method is dependent on the result of the detection.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an effective defense framework to
characterize and defend adversarial videos. We are the first
one to explore the defense for adversarial videos. In light
of the property of the state-of-the-art attacking methods, we
first apply the detection network to detect whether the input
video is attacked and determine the type of attack method.
And then we select the corresponding defensive methods ac-
cording to the result of the detection. A series of experiments
demonstrates that the proposed method can greatly improve
the accuracy of the well-trained video classifier and defend
the state-of-the-art attack methods for video classification.
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